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Wednesday, August 10, 2005

 

Privacy Pooh-Pooh

Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff, with glowing red eyesSecretary of Homeland Security Michael JerkChertoff has told USA Today reporters that, gee, if Americans would just give up some personal information they'll fly more safely (emphasis mine):
Chertoff said there is too much worry over a plan by the Transportation Security Administration to collect passengers' full names and birth dates before they board.

"The average American gives information up to get a CVS (drugstore discount) card that is far more in-depth than TSA's going to be looking at," Chertoff told reporters and editors at USA TODAY's headquarters in McLean, Va. "But I actually make that case that giving up a little bit more information protects privacy."

"Would you rather give up your address and date of birth to a secure database and not be pulled aside and questioned," he said, "or would you rather not give it up and have an increased likelihood that you're going to be called out of line and someone's going to do a secondary search of your bag and they're going to ask you a lot of personal questions in the full view of everybody else?"
Actually, Mike, you forgot one alternative: "...or would you rather not give up any information at all?"

Every time someone in the misAdministration opens his or her mouth to rationalize some misbegotten policy, locusts fly out. Don't these people have to undergo some kind of training in public speaking? (In a way, I hope the answer is no. If it's yes -- if they're trained to talk this way -- we're in even deeper water than even I thought.)

Aside from the frankly Newspeak idiocy of the clause I emphasized, let's look at this idea realistically. The reality is that there's no way this plan will accomplish its stated goal, and only its stated goals.

Its stated goal, obviously, is to increase passenger security. Supposedly, the plan -- dubbed Secure Flight, to hammer the point home -- will increase security by " screen[ing] out potential terrorists by scrutinizing the backgrounds of passengers."

Again, for now let's put aside the fact that Chertoff still hasn't gotten the memo -- the one changing our enemy from terrorists to extremists. How will scrutinizing passenger backgrounds boost security? Listen:
Personal data "can be very helpful in screening out false positives" that lead passengers to be questioned or searched.
If you can't see how eliminating false positives enhances security, you're not alone. Eliminating false positives simply enhances convenience. A worthwhile goal, to be sure, but it's got nothing to do with security. Here's ACLU representative Tim Sparapani on the subject:
"The public does not get any advanced security by giving up more information," Sparapani said. Would-be hijackers can easily foil background checks, he said, by either keeping a clean criminal record or by stealing someone's identity. Money would be better spent on machines that detect plastic explosives on passengers or in bags, he said.
No, asking passengers for their full names and birthdays won't enhance security worth a damn. But you know the real problems with Secure Flight?
At the end of the USA Today feature is this aside:
Chertoff also strongly backed a program that gives special ID cards to people who provide extensive personal data and are certified by the government as having no terrorist ties or criminal warrants. "I would hope that eventually a large number of people find their way into a trusted or vetted traveler program that allows them to move much more readily in and out of the country and within the country," he said.
Got that? They'll ask you for the basic name/address stuff. But if you really want convenience, just give them a lot of personal information. And anyone who provides this "extra" information will be able to move about more freely. Thanks to our crack anti-extremism intelligence forces, you can bet this courtesy won't be extended to anyone who might be actually dangerous!

I do recognize the need for increased security. I don't recognize the value of databasing the identities of everyone on the off-chance that some evildoer will be on a particular flight. Obviously these people could use not only some public-speaking courses, but also some elementary training in the practical use of the law of averages.

Forget Chertoff's reassurances-which-fail-to-reassure. For the straight dope on Secure Flight, see the ever-reliable Bruce Schneier's detailed post on what's really going on behind the scenes -- based on a GAO analysis of the program. Don't forget to read the comments from Schneier's knowledgeable site visitors, while you're at it.


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